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EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENT IN RURAL INDIA

Hans P. Binswa nger
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circula ted to stimul ate discuss ion and critica l comment.
Referen ces in publica tions to Discus sion Papers should
be cleared with the author to protec t the tentati ve
charac ter of these papers.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS RISK:

EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENT IN RURAL INDIA*

Introduction
This paper describes in detail an experiment to measure pure attitudes
towards risk.

The experiment consisted of offering individuals a set of alter

native payoffs which incorporate a tradeoff between expected return and standard
deviation.

The individual classifies himself into a risk aversion interval by

his choice.
A sequence of such games was played with a panel of 240 randomly selected
household heads, in rural India, with 80 of their wives and dependent females and
a few purposely selected individuals.

During the sequence of the game the real

payoffs were raised from trivial levels to expected returns which exceeded monthly
incomes of unskilled laborers.

The sequence of games incorporates tests of its

reliability.
The key result of the paper is that virtually all individuals are risk-averse
when payoffs exceed trivial levels, but that extreme risk aversion is exceedingly
rare as well.

Most individuals have very similar levels of risk aversion.

The paper then explores correlations between individual characteristics
such as wealth, sex, and age with risk aversion.

Wealth appears to have sur

prisingly little effect on the extent of risk aversion.

Schooling tends to reduce

risk aversion, while prior luck in the sequence of games consistently reduces
risk aversion.

Other personal characteristics have less clear impact, and,

in any event, given the similarity of risk attitudes, the quantitative impact
of most variables on the extent of risk aversion is modest.
*Hans P. Binswanger is an Associate of the Agricultural Development Council presently
stationed at the Economic Growth Center of Yale University. The experiment on which
this paper is based was carried out while the author was stationed at the International
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, Hyderabad, India, and with its
generous support. I would like to thank J. G. Ryan, M. von Oppen and Monique Bins
wanger for valuable ideas during the methodology design stage, and B. C. Barah,
R. D. Ghodake, S. S. Badhe, M. J. Bhende, V. Bhaskar Rao, T. Balaramaiah, N. B.
Dudhane, Rekha Gaiki, K. G. Kshirgar, Madhu Nath, and Usha Rani who helped in
carrying out the experiment.
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In this paper the emphasis is on testing the robustness and reliability
of the methodology, comparing its results with interview techniques and on
the correlation of attitudes towards risk with personal characteristics .
In a second paper (Binswanger 1978a) implications of the findings for
psychological, economic and statistical theories of behavior under uncertainty are explored. 1

THE EXPERIMENTAL SEQUENCE AND PRELIMINARY TESTS OF THE METHOD

Prior to experimenting I had become aware of the work of Dillon
and Scandizzo (1975) in Brazil in which they attempted to elicit risk atti
tudes for a large sample of farmers by eliciting certainty equivalents of
tmcertain prospects via interviews.

Their method was adapted to the

Indian conditions and tried there on 240 hous~hold heads.

As

discussed

in the Appendix, it became clear that the interview results were neither
reliable nor replicable; the answers reflected interviewer biases.
After the risk attitude survey had failed, J. G. Ryan and M. von
Oppen suggested experimental approaches with real payoffs. 2

Moral problems

connected with gambling with poor people can be overcome by first handing
out money to them as gifts and putting the maximum possible loss equal to
the gifted amount.
basis.

The experiment described below was designed on this

In designing it the following requirements had to be respected:

The experiment should be simple so that illiterate farmers and landless

1An earlier paper (Binswanger 1978b)
reported some results of this
study without describing the methodology in detail but focussing on
implications of some of the findings for agricult1.1ral development.
2 Experimental efforts to measure utility functions
started with the
work of Mosteller and Nogee (1951). Other methods have also been used by
Davjdson, Suppes and Siegel (1957), Edwards (1955), Becker, a.e Groot and
· Marshak(1964). Some of the procedures are quite complicated. For a
careful review of this line of work see Luce and Suppes (1965).
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laborers could understand it without problem.

It should allow each person

long periods of time to think about his choices, and, if he so desires, he
should be able to consult relatives or friends about them.

Kost agricultural

ly relevant decisions are made on an annual or crop-cycle basis with long
stretches of reflection time in between, and mutual consultation is important.
Furthermore, the payoff and costs should at least reach the range of small
agricultural investments.
Only minimal theoretical commitments were to be made at the outset.
The set of choices should be ranked as 100re or less risky in a unique way
Pure

almost regardless of the definition of risk one might want to adopt.

attitudes towards risk were to be Easured, i.e., they should not be confounded with any other set of preference such as those for leisure.

Nor

should the subjects be confronted with any budget constraints ruling out
certain choices.

One cannot, in measuring pure attitudes to risk, propose

games to individuals for which the worst possible loss exceeds their current cash
holdings.

If one does, one may measure the impact of a cash- or budget-

constraint rather than the pure attitudes towards risk.

1

Furthermore,

differential ability to perform complicated calculations should not •influence
the choices. Finally, dealing with simple coin tosses circumvents the problem
of measuring subjective probabilities • . In short, the choices should
reflect risk attitudes and not any set of constraints.

¾iow apparently "risk-averse" behavior can be induced by budget constraints
or by 1mpertect capital markets is discussed in detail by Robert T. Masson,
1972. Samuelson (1977) has also shown that the failure to consider the effect
of budget constraints or potential bankruptcy as an important determinant of
choice under risk has been one of the main reasons for the confusion surrounding
St. Petersburg Paradoxes.
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An initial methodology was designed and pretested on 10 low-income

individuals known to the author.

The pretest results are not reported here

since all the tests excep·t one have now been done on the much larger random
sample and are reported below.

With minor modification the experiment was

then performed with the full samples.
Table 1 explains the basic method.

Individuals are given forms (which

they can keep) with the numbers of panel A on Table 1.
between alternatives Oto F.

They have to choose

Once they have chosen, a coin will be tossed

and they get the left-hand amo'l.lllts if head comes up or the right-hand amc>1.mt
if tail comes up. 1 Thus probabilities are known. An individual who chooses
0 simply gets 50 Rs. i.e., participation in the game results in an automatic
and sure increase in wealth by 50 Rs. An individual choosing C would receive
30 Rs on head and 150 on tail.
but could gain 100 Rs.

By not choosing zero he stands to lose 20 Rs,

Compared to B, which is 100re relevant, the potential

losses and gains in going to Care 10 and 30 Rs respectively.
choosing F the individual would receive O or 200 Rs.

Finally, by

F has the same expected

return as E, but a higher variance, so only a risk-neutral or risk-p~eferrin~
individual would make the step from E to F.
With each choice I have associated a name with the degree of risk
aversion to simplify the discussion.

Note that each of these names corresponds

to an interval of partial risk aversion S which is fixed regardless of the
level of payoff.

Partial risk aversion was independently defined by Menezes

1 rn the actual game sequence
the winning and loosing side of the coins
were changed for every new game level.
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Table 1:

The Payoffs and Correspondin g Risk Classificati on

Panel A
Choice

Head
Low Payoff

Tail
High Payoff

Risk Aversion
Class

Approximate
Partial Risk
Aversion a/
Coefficient -

...

0

50

50

Extreme

A

45

95

Severe

B

40

120

Intermediat e 1.74

D*

35

125

Inefficient

C

30

150

Moderate

D

20

160

Inefficient

E

10

190

F

0

200

Slight-toNeutral
Neutral-toNegative

to 7.5

7.50 to 1.74

t:.E 'E_/
~•!:.SE

1 to 0.80
0.8 to 0.66

.823

0.66 to 0.50

.823 to .316

0.50 to 0.33

.316 to

O. 33 to 0.00

0

0 to - ..,

0 to - ..,

aFor reasons which are explained in Binswanger (1978), a constant partial
risk aversion function on gains and losses was used to approximate S for the
games.
b

The function has the form U = (1-S)U(l-S) .

i is the slope of the tradeoff between expected returns of and standard
deviation of two games.
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and Hanson (1970) and Zeckhauser and Keeler (1970). 1

It is defined on a

utility function U in terms of certain wealth Was follows.

Let M be the

certainty equivalent of a new prospect and evaluate derivatives at
W

+

Then

M.

S(W

+

M) • - MU" (w+M) /U' (w+M)

(1)

where U' and U" are the first and second derivatives of the utility function.
Other measures of the risk aversion are discussed in Binswanger (1978a),
but S turned out to be the most convenient one. Another measure of
risk aversion which is often useful is the Tradeoff

~

between expected

return and standard deviation.
In the experimental sequence (see Table 2) the individual is not
presented immediately with the alternatives of Table 2, which is called the SO
Rs game, but instead goes through a sequence of games and hypothetical
questions at various game levels.

All game levels are derived from the SO-

Rs-game by multiplying all amotm.ts by a constant.

In the s-Rs-game all

amounts are divided by 10, in the 0.50-Rs-game by 100 and they are urultiplied
by 10 for the S00-Rs-game.

The sequence starts with 5 games at the 0.50

level to teach participants the rules of the game and to convince them
To help

people, the payoff structure was shown as a photograph with the sums of
money to be received indicated by coins placed in each field.

Since

Indian coins vary substantially in shap~ even illiterate persons could clear
ly visualize the payoff.
1

The photographs were handed out to each player

Zeckhauser and Keeler called it size-of-risk aversion.
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Table 2:

Game
Number

Sequenc e of Games and Hypoth etical Questio ns

Minimum delay
since last event~ /

Game
Level Rs.

1

First Day

0.50

Real

All

2

One day

0.50

Real

All

3

One day

0.50

Real

All

4

One day

0.50

Real

All

5

One day

0.50

Real

All

6

One day

50.00

Hypoth etical

Shirap ur
exclude d

7

Same day

5.00

Real

All

Same day

Real or
Hypoth etical

Village ~/

Hand out Rs. 5.00
for next day game

All

8

One day

50.00

Hypoth etical

9

Same day

5.00

10

Same day

5.00

Real
. Hypoth etical

11

Two weeks

500.00

12

Same day

50.00

Hypoth etical}
Real

13

Same day

50.00

Hypoth etical

Kanzar a,
{ Aurepa lli only

14

Same day

50.00

Hvooth etical 'i

(Kalm.::111,

15

Same day

16

Two weeks

17

Same day

Shirap ur
exclude d
All

All
Shirap ur,

i

Kinkhe da,

5.00

H~~ot heticaJ

lnokur only

500.00

Hypoth etical}

Shirap ur,

50.00

Hypoth etical

Kanzar a,
{ Aurepa lli only

aln many cases these minimum delays were exceede d by a few days.
b

There are six village s, two each in three distric ts: Scholap ur distric
t:
Shirapu r and Kalman; Ahola distric t: Kanjar a and Kinkhe da; Mahboobnagar
distric t: Dokur and Aurepa lli. Each village contain s a panel of 40 house
holds and househ old heads were include d in all village s. In Kinkhed a
and
Dokur the most import ant depend ent female in each househ old was also include
d
in the experim ent in additio n to the head of househ old who, on occasio
n,
was female.
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and left with them through the entire five to six weeks period of the
experiment.

The Study Sample and Methodological Tests
The study was carried out in 240 rural households which constitute
the Village-Level Studies of the International Coops Research Institute
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), Hyderabad, India. 1

These studies

are located in the semi-arid (seasonally dry) tropical tracts of Maharashtra
and Andrah Pradesh, some of the poorer regions of India.

In Jtme 1976 the

average net wealth of these households was Rs 21716, i.e. roughly U.S.
$2500 per household.

The wealth is very tmevenly distributed

and 47% of the households had less than Rs. lOOOOof wealth ($1162).

Daily

wage rates for unskilled laborers varied from Rs. 3 in the slack season to
Rs. 6 in the peak season.
fore commensurate

The average payoff in the 50-Rs.-gamc is there

with monthly

wages.

Playing the game with the full

random sample was a shocking reminder of their poverty.

1

The village level studies of ICRISAT where started in May 1975 under
the supervision of J. G. Ryan, N. S. Jedha and myself as a lon5term data
gathering effort on a panel of 40 randomly selected households in each of
the six purposely selected villages and include landless laborers as well as
farmers, i.e. a cross-section of the entire rural population: Data are collected
on~producer and consumer capital~ time allocation, agricultural production,
nutrition and income and expenditure as well as some agrobiological observa
tions. Each household is interviewed at 2 to 4 week intervals by resident
investigators. For more details see Jodha et al. 1977, Binswanger and
Jodha 1976, Binswanger et al. 1977. The studies are now in
their fourth year and a considerable portion has 1,,een added to the data
collection over the past two years.
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Up to the 5 Rs level, the sequence was played with all 240 household heads
of the sample (of which 20

were women) although temporary absences from

villages made some of the sequences incomplete.
(118 households) the full sequence was played.

In 3 of the six villages
In addition, in two villages

the most' important dependent female of the household--usually the wife--was
also included in the experiment up to the 5 Rs level (the dependent female
sample). In 5 villages a nonrandom sample of the 3 most "progressive"
farmers of the village was added (the progressive farmer sample I).

1

The resident male investigators played the 0.50 Rs game with the household
heads and temporary female investigators played them with the dependent
females.

The resident male investigators played the 0.50-game.

The 5-Rs

games were played by B. C. Barah, Ghodake or myself with the help of the
investigators.

Assisted by the investigators, I played all SO-Rs-games

to ensure uniformity of method and to protect the investigators from
objections which might be raised by the villagers if they were disappointed
by the outcome.

In fact, the stoic way in which all respondents took

losses was remarkable.

To make sure that each respondent had sufficient

time to make a choice, the choices were first ascertained by the investigators,
who made pairwise comparisons among alternatives until the respondent
stopped switching.

The economist who played the game then verified the

1 Progressive farmers are early adopters of new techniques. They
were identified by the resident investigators on the basis of their knowledge

of the villages.
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choice again by making pairwise compariso ns with those alternativ es adjoin
ing the chosen one. 1
In approxim ately 250 games which I played there were only 2 or 3
instances in which the alternativ e selected with the interview ers differed
from the one verified by me.

Once made, choices were firmly adhered to

despite the frequent assertion s that the responden ts could shift as much and
as long as they wanted.
Finally, a few impressio nistic observati ons may be reported here:
Responden ts enjoyed the game and most of them spent much time waiting for
their turns, sometimes discussin g how much was gained or lost by others.
No attempt was made to prevent or encourage this.

In fact, this helped in

establish ing the strictnes s of the rules of the game and the certainty of
the payments.

It also prevented any attempt by responden ts to argue about

the outcomes of the coin tosses.

Agricultu ral decisions and their outcomes

are similar public knowledge , since everyone sees them in the field.
The sequence contains a series of tests designed to evaluate accuracy
and replicab ility of the method and to evaluate the accuracy of answers
to hypothet ical questions .

A basic question about the method is whether

behavior with given money would be different from the behavior when owned
money was a risk.

One would hypothesi ze tha~ if there were any differenc es,

people would be more cautious with owned money than with given money.

While

pretestin g the experimen tal sequence with 10 individua ls known to me, I did
ask them, at one stage, to play the 5Rs game with their own money.

Nine out

1 1f an adjoining
alternativ e was inefficie nt, a pairwise compariso n
was also made with the next efficient one.
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Table 3:

Game
Number

Sair.ple and
Villages

Extreme

Severe

A Given money
No. 7, 5Rs

All
Vil lages

B 11 0WN 11 Money

No. 9, 5Rs

Inter
mediate

Moderate

Slight
to
Neutral

Neutral
to
Negative

Ineffi
cient

Sample
Size

Playing with given m:,ney versus "own" money

Panel A:
Ho,•sehold
Heads

Preliminary Tests of the Method

.8

10.2

23.3

39.0

8.9

8.9

8.9

236

.8

6.0

24.3

34.0

14.9

10.6

9.4

235

Comparison of Hypothetical versus Real games

Panel B:
Hol!sehold
Heads

C Hypothetical
No.6, 50Rs

10.4

11.7

16.9

25.9

10.4

10.4

14.3

77

Kanzara

D Hypothetical
No.8, 50Rs

10.4

2.6

14.3

38.9

15.6

6.5

11. 7

77

2.6

3.8

29.4

38.5

10.3

2.6

12.8

78

No.13, 50Rs

5.1

3.8

30.8

32.1

9.0

3.8

15.4

78

Hypothetical
No,17, 50Rs

0

2.6

28.2

56.4

3.8

1.3

7.7

anc'
Aurepalli

E

Real
No.12, 50Rs

F Hypothetical
G

--------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------Household
Heads
Shirapur,
Kanzara and

Aurepalli

H Hypothetical
No.11, 500 Rs
(llefore 50 Keal)

1.7

12.7

39.9

27.1

7.6

3.4

7.6

us

I Hypothetical
No,16, 500 Rs
(After 50 Real)

2.5

13.6

51. 7

28.8

0

0.9

2.5

118

Panel C:
Household
Heads

J

Kanzara,

K No.9, 5Rs
Including D*

Kini heda,

78

------------

No.9, 5Rs
Including D

Test of the Central Tendency Hypothesis
D*

0

6.3

8.9

39.2

19.0

15.2

1.3

1.3

ll.8

39.5

21.1

15.8

D
11.4

79
79

9.2

Aurr·palli and.

Femeles of
Kini heda

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Household
Heac's

L No.12, 50Rs Real

Kanzara,

M No,12, 50Rs Real
Including D*

Kini heda

Including D

2.6

2.6

30.8

43.6

10.2

0

2.6

5.1

28.2

33.3

10.3

5.1

Chi-Square Tests with 6 degrees of Freedom
and critical

Note:

x2 0 _05

• 12.59

All numbers in % of a sample size.

Distributions
Co!!!eared
A vs
C vs
D VS
F vs
G vs

B
E
E
E
E

Chi-Sguare
7.37
15.02
10.16
1.59
8.48

Distributions
ComEared
F vs G
H vs I
J vs K
L vs M

10.2

39
39

15.4

Chi-Sguare
14 .12
15.91
4.16
3.31
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of the 10 chose the same alternative as when playing with given money,
whereas the 10th shifted towards an alternative which was more risk-averse.
In the large-scale experiment the test was performed differently.

the

On

first 5-Rs-game (Number 7) no money was given out before the choice.

But

5 Rs were handed out for the second 5-Rs-game (Number 9) on the day preceding
the game.
On the day of game 9, individuals had to put that amount of money on
the table which their gamble put at risk, if they wanted to play.

(Since

they had had it for a day it was their "own" money, so to speak.)

No

pressure whatsoever was applied to play at all.

Non-attendance to the

game on that day was interpreted as a choice of the riskless alternative
zero.

As

can be seen from Table 3 Panel A, the choices on the two 5-Rs

games did not differ statistically from each other for the household heads.
(See Chi-Square value A vs B,)
was similar.

The results for the females is not shown but

Among the males there was a very modest shift towards less

risk aversion, which is contrary to the hypothesis that there is any
difference in behavior when only gains are considered than when both gains
1
and losses are considered.
The second test concerns the usability of answers to hypothetical
games.

It was hoped that after playing the full sequence up to the 50

Rs

level, individuals would acquire the introspective ability to tell how they
would play at the 500 Rs level.

One could then use the hypothetical answers

1 This finding is further supported by the rationalizations of their
choices which individuals were asked to give after the real 50-Rs-game
Number 12. Only about 1/4 of the respondents with considerable verbal skills
were able to given any explanation at all. But these verbalizations were
invariably cast in terms such as the following: "If I choose B rather than
A, I lose 5 Rs on head but gain 25 Rs on tail; but if I further shift to C,
I lose 10 Rs for a gain of only 30 Rs. Therefore I prefer B." The long
sequence of games seemed to teach people to regard the certain amounts as their
own, or, alternatively, not to make a difference between "real" gains and
losses and opportunity gains and losses.
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as if they were real choi ces.

Hyp othe tical games 6, 8 and 15 at the 50

Rs leve l were intro duce d to be compared
in 2 villa ges (Aur epal li and Doku r)

with the real 50--Rs-game.

The resu lts are repo rted in Pane l B of Tabl
e 3.
They show that , befo re play ing the 50-R s-gam
e, (dis tribu tion s C and U)
peop le beli eve that they will eith er act
more aver sely or less aver sely to
risk than they actu ally do in the real game
E. The diffe renc e betw een the
outc omes in games 6 and 12 is stat istic ally
sign ifica nt. In the seco nd
hyp othe tical game (Nuni>er 8), the pred ictin
g abil ity has impr oved , prob ably
beca use one game at the 5 Rs leve l taug ht
peop le bett er abou t thei r pref er
ence s. How ever, once the 50-R s-gam e is play
ed, answ ers to hypo thet ical
ques tion s are sim ilar to the real game.
Ther e is no stat istic ally sign i
fica nt diff eren ce betw een the real choi ces
in game 12 and the hyp othe tica l
answ ers to games 13 or 17, altho ugh in game
17 ther e is a tren d towa rds
furt her conc entr atio n into the two cent ral
cate gori es. This indi cate s that
pred ictiv e power is pret ty good afte r expo
sure to a game at high stak es.
Note also the subs tant ial diff eren ce in the
answ ers to the hypo thet ical
500 ~s ~am e befo re the real 50- Rs-game (Num
ber 11) and afte r the real 50
Rs~a me (Number 16). The same tren ds towa
rds conc entr atio n obse rved at the
50-R s-gam e leve l are repe ated . This may
be take n as an indi cati on that ,
at the end of the expe rime ntal sequ ence ,
peop le are fair ly well able to
pred ict how t~ey would act at payo ff leve
ls subs tant ially diff eren t from
the ones actu ally play ed. I will thus trea
t the answ er to game number 16
on par with the real answ ers, but disr egar
d all hypo thet ical answ ers give n
befo re the real 50 ~-ga me. 1
1Ano

ther reas on for acce ptin g the Rs 500 answ
ers is the fact that ,
desp ite freq uent den ials , many resp onde nts
cont inue to hope stro ngly that the
500- Rs-g ame will be play ed in the futu re
and the inve stig ator s are freq uent ly
aske d when that will happ en. The pros pect
is no long er unre al to them .
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The third test is to invest igate whethe r indivi duals, when confro
nted
with a game such as in Table 1, have an autom atic tenden cy toward
s al
ternat ives in the center of the distri bution .

Table 2 contai ns two risk

ineffi cient altern atives D and D*, which are derive d from C and
F respec tively
and have the same means but higher varian ce.

No risk-a verse indivi dual

should choose these altern atives and they were introd uced precis
ely to test
wheth er people could detect stocha stic domina nce in this simple
contex t.
Note that in a game struct ure contai ning D but not D*, altern
ative C
is the most centra l altern ative, and under the "centr al tenden
cy hypot hesis, "
should be the most prefer red one.

On the other hand, if Dis delete d from

Table 1, altern ative D* become s the most centra l one.

In three villag es

(Kanja ra, Kinkhe da and Aurep alli) half the respon dents were given
the game
struct ure contai ning the altern ative D while the other half were
given the
game struct ure contai ning D*.

Panel C of Table 3 shows that,· at the 5 Rs

level (distr ibutio n J and K),the freque ncy of choosi ng D* is
lower than
of choosi ng D, thus contra dictin g the centra l tenden cy hypoth
esis.

At the

50 Rs level (distr ibutio n Land M) the freque ncy of D* is higher
than for
D.

But at both game levels the freque ncy distri bution s associ ated
with the

two game struct ures can not be distin guishe d statis ticall y.
Prior to the experi ment with real payoff s we had made an attemp
t to
measu re attitu des toward s risk via the Dillon -Scand izzo interv
iew proced ure
but gradua lly discov ered that that proced ure was unreli able and
non-re plicab le.
Our suspic ion of the reliab ility of the Dillon -Scand izzo interv
iew method
was initia lly arouse d by the fact that, within the same region
(Schol apur
distri ct), Inves tigato r A was record ing substa ntiall y lower levels
of risk
aversi on than Inves tigato r Bin the interv iews.

We theref ore reinter viewe d

the villag ers with the same method but by switch ing invest igator
s across the
villag es.

From this it became clear that the risk aversi on measur e of the
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interviews reflected interviewer biases more than anything else.

(see the

Appendix for a detailed discussion)
To test whether the experimental method with real payoffs is also
subject to investigator biases, the sample in each village of the Scholapur
area was split in half and each half assigned for the full experimental
sequence to one of the two investigators.

No statistically significant

differences could be detected between the risk aversion distributions of the
two halves of the sample.

Thus no evidence of investigator bias could be

uncovered for the experimental method.

THE MAIN EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The Risk Aversion distributions corresponding to different game levels
are given in Table 4, first for those villages where the game was played up
to the 50 Rs level (with a hypothetical answer at the 500 Rs level) and
then for all the households, including those where the eame was played only
up to the 5 Rs level.
It is clear from the table that the risk aversion distribution

shifts very markedly to the left as game levels rise.

As

can be

seen from Table~ this implies increasing partial risk aversion or increasing
risk aversion as measured by the tradeoff

~

between expected return and standard

deviation. 1
Consider the Slight-to-Neutral and Neutral-to-Preferred classes:
At the 0.50 level the percentage in each of these classes is around 15 to
20% and it falls monotonically to near zero as the payoff level rises to
500 Rs.

In the moderate risk aversion class we initially find around 25%

of the individuals.

This fraction first rises at the 5Rs and 50 Rs levels

1 In Binswanger (1978a) it is
shown that absolute risk aversion is
decreasing while relative risk aversion is first decreasing and then
increasing.
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because people enter this class when leaving the lower risk aversion classes.
But between the 50 and 500 Rs level the number of entrants from lower risk
aversion is lower than the number of individuals who become more risk averse
The intermediate risk aversion

and the frequency in this class declines.

class starts out with 28.5 of individuals in game 2 at the 0.50 RS level.
As

that game is repeated people prefer to play at higher stakes.

But as

the payoff level rises again, more people enter this class from the
lower risk aversion classes and at the 500 Rs level more than 50% of individuals
are concentrated in this single class, to which a partial risk aversion co
efficient corresponds of 0.823 to 1.74.

The 500 Rs game corresponds to

payoffs in the order of substantial fertilizer investments for these house
holds, and many are too poor to undertake them.

For some households it even

exceeds net wealth.
The extreme and severe risk aversion classes together contain less
than 10% of the individuals for all levels except the 500 Rs level where
this rises to 15%.

There appears to be an upper barrier on risk aversion

which is exceeded only very slowly at high stakes.
As

is shown in more detail in appendix Table A-2, individuals' ,refer

ences for a given alternative are not very stable.
two .SW.Rs-games (No. 7 and 9) only 40%
native both times.

For example in the

of individuals chose the same alter-

Most of the shifts, however, are into or from neighboring

efficient and inefficient alternatives
In any given game, arotmd 10% of individuals choose one of the in
efficient alternatives.

This is clearly lower than the percentage of

individuals who would choose it on a random basis.

Consider game 12.

Inefficient alternatives exist between the intermediate and moderate and the
moderate and slight-to-neutral alternative.

These three clas$eS and

Table 4.

Payoff Level
& Game Number

Extreme

The Effect of Payoff Size on Distributio n of Risk Aversion

Severe

Intermediate

Household Heads:
A 0.50
No. 2

Moderate

SlighttoNeutral

NeutraltoNegative

Inefficient

Sample
Size

ShiraEur 2 Kanzara 1 AureEalle

1.7

5.9

28.5

20.2

15.1

18.5

10.1

119

1.7

8.1

14.5

29.3

21.3

16.6

8.5

235

0.9

8.5

25.6

36.8

12.0

8.5

7.7

117

D 50
No. 12

2.5

5.1

34.8

39.8

6.8

1.7

9.3

118

E 500 H
No. 16

2.5

13.6

51. 7

28.8

0

0.9

2.5

118

B
C

0.50
No. 4 + 5
5
No. 7

All Household Heads
F

0.50
Games 2 + 3

1.7

7.6

18.5

22.7

17.1

18. 7

13.7

475

Games 4 + 5

0.9

8.2

12.9

27.5

22.8

18.4

8.3

473

H 5.00
Games 7 + 9

0.8

8.1

23.8

36.5

11.9

9.8

9.1

471

G

o.so

Distributio ns tested
A

VS
CVS

A
R
D
A
F
G

VS

vs
vs
vs
vs
vs

C vs D vs E
D vs E
C
D
E
B
G
H

CHI-SQR

dF

85.68
48.49
11.91
44.22
23.46
13.17
Hi.30
50.02

18
12
6
6

6
6
6

6

2
x0.05
28.87
21.03
12.59
12.59
12.59
12.59
12.59
12.59

.....
....,
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the ineff icien t one conta in 78.57. of indiv idual s.

If peop le would fall

es at rando m, the two
into the two ineff icien t and three effic ient class
1/5 of the 78.5%
ineff icien t class es shoul d conta in at the very least
is 9.3%, i.e. a littl e
obse rvati ons, i.e. 15.7% , but the actua l perce ntage
more than half.
Who choos es

ineff icien tly varie s much acros s game s.

9.
indiv idual s playe d all the games from No. 1 to No.

287

Of those 94 or 33%

once, i.e. did not
chose one of the ineff icien t alter nativ es at least
, or did not care abou t it
recog nize that they were stoch astic ally domi nated
at least once.
The evide nce can thus be summ arized as follo ws.

For indiv idual s who

fairl y rapid ly as game
initi ally have low risk avers ion it tends to rise
indiv idual s who initi ally
level s start to rise beyon d trivi al leve ls. For
ion, it decli nes slowl y
have inter medi ate to mode rate level s of risk avers
or rema ins fairl y cons tant as game level s rise.
coef ficie nts much
Very few indiv idual s have parti al risk avers ion
is excee ded for less
above 1.74 and even at fairl y high stake s that level
Chi-S quare tests , these
than 15% of indiv idual s. As can be seen from the
in both the reduc ed samp le
trend s are stati stica lly sign ifica nt and evide nt
as well as the full samp le of house holds .
ty fi.mc tion for
Inter prete d in a utili ty theor y frame work, the utili
incom e for all but one
money incom e is nonli near and risk- avers e in money
1
At game level s of 50 Rs.
out of 118 indiv idual s.

1 The one perso n who- -at the 50 Rs leve l-cho se the most risky alter nativ e
was a tuber culos is
willi ngne ss to play the same at the 500 Rs level

and indic ated
whose house we went to play.
patie nt whom most peop le expec ted to die and to
Rs game was a boy of 16 years
The other indiv idual who playe d a most risky 50
Rs level anym ore.
and he did not want to play that game at the 500
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and above, three-fou rths or more of all individua ls fall into only two
risk aversion classes, the intermedi ate and moderate one.

This concentra tion

of risk attitudes within a fairly narrow interval is quite remarkabl e, and
- implies that in explainin g economic behavior of these rural household s, risk
aversion will be important for virtually all of them.

On

the other hand it

will be difficult to explain differenc es in behavior among them on account
of differenc es in pure attitudes towards risk.
These results contrast sharply with the results of Dillon and Scandizzo
(1977), which are discussed in the Appendix.

They also conflict sharply

with the distribut ion of risk attitudes found for the same sample with
the same interview technique than Dillon and s-candizzo used.
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Correlation of Risk Aversion with Personal Characteristics

Empirically, virtually nothing is known about how personal
-characteristics of individuals are correlated with risk aversion.
The data set collected in India is well suited to explore this issue
with multiple regression analysis of personal characteristics on the

extent of risk aversion at different game levels.

We should note at

the outset, however, that individual characteristics, at least at high
game levels, cannot be expected to have a massive impact on risk aversion
simply because most people have similar attitudes.
Ideally, we would like to know the causal relationships from
personal characteristics,such as wealth, schooling, etc., to risk aver
sion, and the reverse causality from risk aversion to earnings ability
and schooling choices.

This however, poses formidable simultaneous

equation problems which eventually have to be solved by simultaneous
equation techniques.

As it stands, the data set does not yet contain

sufficient truly exogenous variables which can be used as instruments
to identify a full simultaneous equation model.
to nn

~hi~

h~~

hPPn

inir;~r~n

uithin

However, data gathering

the ICRISAT village-level-studies.

In the meantime, multiple regression techniques can, for most variables,
only indicate correlations corrected for the other individual variables.
A second problem is the choice of the dependent variable and its
functional form.

Should we use partial risk aversion

l
S ,or Z, or should

we simply assign integers to the alternatives Oto F going from Oto 5 and

1Partial risk aversion
is a multiplicative transformation of absolute
risk aversion at each game level and regressing on partial risk aversion
amounts to the same thing as a regression on absolute risk aversion.
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use them as indic ators of risk avers ion?

And shou ld these meas ures be

used direc tly or be trans forme d into logar ithms
or other forms ? For
corre latio n analy sis one would like to choos e that
varia ble and varia ble
trans form ation which is best able to captu re the
corre latio ns, as long
as the choic e of diffe rent forms doe·s not lead to
contr adict ory resu lts.
Ther efore , a serie s of exper imen tal regre ssion s
was perfo rmed with the
follo wing forms and varia bles: Alter nativ e Numb
er; Z; ln Z; logis tic
of Z; S ln s;
k = 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.5, 0.66; logis tic on S. These
trans form ation s had littl e impac t on sign patte rns
of the coef ficie nts
but Zand ln s perfo rmed best in terms of -2
R and gave very simil ar resu lts.
Ther efore , the regre ssion s on Ins are repo rted.

l,

Secon d, for Sand Z, the choic es of an alter nativ
e only indic ate
a range of the risk avers ion coef ficie nt S or the
varia ble Z.

The

arith meti c mean of the endp oints of the inter vals
was assig ned to each
choic e as an estim ate of Z. For S, the geom etric
mean of the endp oints
was assig ned as the measu re of s.

The geom etric mean was chose n becau se

the inter val lengt h for each choic e incre ases mark
edly as we move to
more risk- avers e alter nativ es. 1 Probl err~ also arise
in assig ning a
value for Zand s to alter nativ es F and 0. In the
case of F, a value of
zero was given to Sand Z, altho ugh it could be
nega tive. Given the
resu lt that prac tical ly no one prefe rs risk at high
game leve ls, a value
of zero is not unrea sonab le. 2 For alter nativ e 0,
the upper bound for
S is equa l to infin ity, while its lower bound is
7 .50. Since the expe ri
ment al resu lts indic ate that very few indiv idual
s chose alter nativ e zero, _
1 For
alter nativ e Eat one of the endp oints Sc O and
the geom etr~c
mean of both endp oints would be zero. Ther efore
, the arith meti c mean
was chose n in this case.
2

.

For logar ithm ic trans form ation s, a value of zero
is inadm issab le.
It was there fore - rathe r arbit raril y - set at 0.007
.
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it is reasonab le to assume that their partial risk aversion should not
exceed 7.5 by very much and this value was increase d by 12% to give a
value of 8.4.

For Z the assignm ent was less arbitrar y.

One can show

that--fo r games with equal probabi lities--Z cannot exceed 1. 1

Since the

lowe·r bound is O. 8, the mean value of O. 9 was assigned to choice zero.
Note that at higher game levels very few individu als choose alternat ives
O or F so that the--adm ittedly arbitrar y--choic es just describe d should
have little impact on the regressi on results.
Third, it is not clear how to treat the choices of ineffici ent
alternat ives.

It would, of course,b e best to simply leave out all indi

viduals who chose an ineffici ent alternat ive at least once in the
sequenc e.

However , that leads to a loss of about one-thir d of the sample,

which is especia lly harmful at the high game levels, where only 118
individu als played.

An alternat ive would be to leave out, in each regress

ion, those individu als who chose an ineffici ent alternat ive in that game.
But then each regressi on would be over a differen t data set with unknown
impact.

Finally, one can assume that individu als who choose D* or D

have essentia lly the same attitude s as those who choose Band C
the alternat ives have
standard deviatio n.
1

the same expected return and only slightly higher

To test whether such a treatmen t has any effect on

Consider two alternat ives with a bad and a good outcome of equal
probabi lity:
Alterna tive
Bad luck
Good luck
E
SE
0
5
5
5
0
1
5
7
6
1
6E
For these alternat ives Z = ASE s 1, but all risk averters who prefer
more to less will choose alternat ive one, hence the largest Z is 1.
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the results , such regress ions were run and compare d to regress ions where
all individ uals who choose ineffic iently at least once in the games No.
1
to No. 9 were left out.

These regress ions differe d little from each

other and coeffic ient signs were the same except for coeffic ients with
extrem ely low t-value s. But the added observ ations resulte d in lower
standa rd errors of coeffic ients and the results reporte d thus include
the ineffic ient choices as Band C choices respec tively.
Fourth , differe nt subsets of the data might lead to differe nt
regress ion results and - for tmknown reasons - should not be combin ed.
Theref ore, severa l regress ions were perform ed on differe nt data subsets
to test whethe r this is indeed a problem .

The subsets were as follow s:

The full sample , the househ old heads of those village s where the full
sequenc ~ of games was played (Aurep alli, Shirap ur, Kanzar a),the house
hold heads of the other three village s (Dokur, Kalman, Kinkhe da) and
finally the depend ent females of Dokur and Kinkhe da.
F tests indicat ed that for regress ions on Zand log S, the data
sets could be combined easily for all games·2 , 5, 7 and 9. 1

But because

the data for depend ent females is not indepen dent of that of the househ
old
heads, the final regress ions reporte d include only househ old heads of
all six village s.
Lastly , there are issues of the functio nal form of the indepen dent
variab les.

Includi ng both linear and square terms of all continu ous inde

penden t variab les resulte d in only nonsig nifican t square terms and

1

The larges t F value for combin ing the data sets was 1.376 agains t
a critica l value at the 10% level of approx imately 1.45. All other
F
values were substa ntially lower.
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was abandoned .

Age and wealth (the only variables which had no zero

observati ons) were also included in logarithm ic form.

But the resulting

coefficie nt led to the same qualitati ve results as when they were included
linearily .
Running so many experimen tal regressio ns is justified in an
explorato ry study in an area where so little is known.

It helps to

distingui sh robust results from spurious ones which can only be demon
strated for particula r functiona l forms or data subsets.

The results

of these experimen ts are summarize d in Table 5 which shows the sign
patterns and patterns of significa nce of different coefficie nts for
18 experimen tal regressio ns:

8 experimen ts on functiona l forms of

dependent variables , 2 experimen ts on including or excluding inefficie nt
choices, 5 experimen ts to look at different subparts of the data, and
2 experimen ts on ftmctiona l forms of dependent variables .

Each of the

18 specifica tions was used for games No. 2, 5, 7, 9, 12 and 16.

Game

No. 2 was used rather than game one because in game one the rules of
the game might not have been fully clear to all individua ls.
In Table 5, one plus or minus sign indicates that the coefficie nt
was of the respectiv e sign in more than 3/4 of the experimen tal regress
ions.

Two plus or minus signs indicate that the sign was the same in

all experime nts.
consisten t.

A question mark means that the sign pattern was not

One star means that the coefficie nt was statistic ally signi

ficant at the 10% level in at least one of the experimen tal regressio ns.
Two stars means that the coefficie nt was statistic ally significa nt in
at least 2/3 of the cases when it had the indicated sign.

Three stars
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Table 5

Robus tness of Signs of Variab les in Differ ent Regres sion Experi
ments

Game Level
Game Number

0.50 Rs

No. 2

Women

?

-*

Progre ssive

?

-*

Workin g Age
Adults per family

?

Salary
Land Rented

5 Rs

No. 5
+

No. 7

*
~

+

*

?

**

Gambl ers
Age

+

Schoo ling

?

Assets

*

*

?

+*b

--*

?

-*

+

+

*

**
+

-

+

+

*

Luck

*
+(or -)

*
*

*
*

500 Rs
No. 16

?

++

++

?
?

*

Net
Trans fers
Receiv ed

Symbo ls used:

+

50 Rs.
No. 12

No. 9

*

*

?

?

?

+

*

?

-*

?

-*b

*
*

*

-

**

+

?

***

*

The coeffi cient is positi ve (or negati ve) in 3/4th or more of
all cases.

++(o r--) The coeffi cient is positi ve (or negati ve) in all cases
?
Sign uncert ain

*

**
***
a

The coeffi cient is sl.gnif icant in at least one case (10%) level.
The coeffi cient in statis ticall y signif icant in at least 2/3
of the cases when it has the sign indica ted (10% level) .
The coeffi cient is statis ticall y signif icant in all cases (10%
level) .

Total of 18 experi ment~ lobrkin g adults , salary , land rented ,
and gamble rs were includ ed
in only some of the experi ments .
b
.
The contra dictio ns of sign arise
in differ ent data subse t.
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mean that it was always statistic ally significa nt.
Overall, the experimen ts indicate that within any given game the
sign patterns are fairly robust.

Only in one case (regressio n No. 9) was

the dummy for females statistic ally significa nt with opposite sign in dif
ferent subsets of the data (but not across variable specifica tions).

However,

In what follows,

across games the sign patterns are much less consisten t.
the results are discussed variable by variable.

In Table 6 the coefficie nts of the variables with ln Sare given.
The following discussio n refers to both Table 5 and 6 to judge the coeffi
cients and their stability .

To judge the magnitu~e of the effects implied,

Table 7 computes a predicted S for the 5 and 50 Rs levels and compares it
with the geometric average Sin the sample (first line, underline d values).
The predicted Sis computed as follows:

Add to the average S the shift

implied in the regressio n coefficie nt and a move from the average value of
the independe nt variable to the largest value observed in the sample.

1

This means that we compute the effect of the largest possible shift away
from the mean of each independe nt variable.

The table also shows which

choice would be implied by the new value ofS.
Thirteen variables were included in the regressio n, apart from the
village dummies, which were included to take account of effects on risk
aversion of such variables as agroclima tic differenc es, etc.
Assets:

Economist s usually assume that rich people should be more

willing to engage in favorable games of a fixed size than poor people,
i.e. for any given game level, partial risk aversion Sor Z
-

1
Predicted S • exp {~r 1 log Si}+ exp {bj (Xjmax - Xj)} where n is
the sample size and Xj the j'th independe nt variable and Xj is the arith
metic mean, and bj is its estimated coefficie nt.
1
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Table 6:

Regression of Personal

Characteri ■ tics

on Partial Risk Aversion

50 llupees 500 Rs

5 Rupees

0.5 llupees
Dependentb
Variable

No. 2

No. 5

No. 7

No. 9

No. 12

Intercept

-2.317

-2.331

-1.030

-1.825

.174

Village 1

.782
(1. 74) *

,724
(1. 60)

.489
(1.42)

.568
(1.58)

.270
(1.03)

-.313
(1.80)*

1.447
(3.37)*

(.97)

.207
( .63)

.639
(1.87)*

Village 3

1,397
(3.16)*

1. 735
(3.94)•

.919
(2.75)*

0.952
(2.72)*

.451
(1.84)*

-.165
(1.01)

Village 4

.943
(2.19)*

.409
(.94)

(i. 74)

.207
(.50)

.741
(1. 78)*

•689
(2,18)*

-. 797
(2.62)*

.613
(1.36)

.763
(1.69)*

.113
(.33)

-.687
(1.92)*

farmer dummy

-.187
(,40)

-.850
(1.83)*

-.772
(2.19)

.0630
(.17)

Working age Adults
(share age 15-59)

.200
(.35)

-.529
(.94)

.126
(.30)

Sala-ry
(1000 Rs/month)

.171
(. 76)

.... 0644
(.29)

-.354
(2.08)*

Land Rented
(hectores)

-.0526
(.95)

-.156
(2. 81)*

-.0343
(,81)

-.386
(.40)

.243
(.33)

-.906
(1.18)

-.0379
(.01)

.210
(.58)

.0173
(1.65)

.00728
(.91)

.0154
(1.86)*

-.0137
(1.71)*

-.00247
(.46)

- • 0124

-.0743

-.0432

-.0370

Village 2

Village 6
Women
Progressive

Gambler dummy
Age (yrs)

Schooling (yrs)

-.962
(1.00)
.00968
(,92)
• 0430
( .93j

Assets
(in 1000 Rs)

-.0134
(2.42)*

Net transfers
received (in
1000 Rs)
Luck

-.139

F
N•,

obs.

.418

( .27)

-.00461
(.84)

.576

(2.14)*

No. 16
.426

.306
(.87)

.0273
(.OB)

-.0248
(.11)

-.154
(,41)

-.320
(1.26)

.709
(1.60)

.207
(,49)

.327
(1.17)

-.198
(1.12)

-.141
(.77)

-.208
(1,70)*

.0145
(.33)

.0111
(.30)

.0476
(.80)

.000758
(0)

(1.23)

-.00376
(.81)

-.00945
(2.16)*

-.00216
(.45)

-.0011
(. 34)
.00482
( .17)

-.340
(1.90)*

-.265
(1.94)*

-.141

(. 77)

( .99)

-.0463
( .44)

-.212
(1.69)*

-.209
(3.20)*

-.126
(2.69)*

-.107
(2.37)*

-.115
(2.72)*

-.0425
(1.67)*

.100

.171

.192

.212

.055

.088

2.644

3.928

4.370

4.818

1.491

1.816

228

228

228

228

111

111

8

The values in parenthesis are t-value. * indicates that a variable is statistically
significant at the 0.1 level.
:to.1, CD • 1.645; to.1, 120 • 1.658; Fo.1, 14, CD • i.so
b

In terms of partial risk aversion coefficients S, the dependent variable was in <:J/7)
for all bets. In terms of A the dependent variable is the following functions of A;
0. SO-Rs-games Y • 1n (A/10); SO-Rs-game Y • ln (A x 10); 500-Rs-level; Y • ln "(A x 100).
The-interce~t term has been converted to reflect the intercept of s.
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Table 7:

The Largest Possible Shifts in Choices Implied in the Regression Results

Explanatory
Variable

Maximum
Minus Mean
Yaluen

Average Sb

Predicted

s

Choice
Implied

at 5 Rs Level

Predicted
Sat
50 P.s Level

Choice
Implied

.483

C

.705

C {-+B2

Women

1

.540

C

• 724

C (-+B)

Progressive

1

.223

E

• 604

C

Working Adults
0.5
(share age 15-59)
Rs 5.069
Salary
(Rs 1000)
38 Years
Age

.515

C

.750

C (-+ti)

.oso-

E

• 345

C (-+E)

.637

C

.418

C

12 Years

.198

E

.420

C

185. 277

.243

E

6.224

.093

E

.528

C

5

.257

E

• 396

C

Schooling
Assets
(Rs 1000)
Transfer income
(Rs 1000)
Luck

d

aFor dummy variables the value taken was one.
bAntilog of average of ln S
c Y(+ X)

This notation means that the value of S implies choice of alternative

Y, but that it is close to the indifference point with X.
d

Coefficient has wrong sign.

C

(the tradeoff between expected return and standard deviation) should
decrease as wealth rises.

In the ·regressions , wealth is measured by

gross sales value of physical assets. 1

In these households, on average

69% of physical wealth is held in the form of land.

In the semi-arid

tropical environment , land gives rise to highly variable income 6trearns.
The weakness of the relationshi p between physical assets and risk
aversion is very surprising, given the fairly strong effect of the game
size.

Within a given game and across games, the sign of the coefficient

is not consistently negative, although negative signs predominate and
only negative signs are ever statistical ly significant .

The largest

statistical ly significant coefficient of -.0116 in game 9 implies
that a shift from average wealth to the .largest wealth observed in the
sample is not entirely sufficient to bring an individual from choice C
to risk neutrality.

It would not be sufficient to move an individual

who initially was indifferent between A and B to choose alternative E.
For the crucial 50-Rs-game, the coeff'icient is usually of the
wrong sign (positive, close to zero and not significant ).

Contrary to

all expectation s, wealth has little impact on individuals ' behavior at
game levels which are connnensurat e with monthly wage rates.
Schooling: Another form of wealth is human wealth and schooling
is a proxy variable for it.

Average schooling in the sample is 2 years,

but the maximum is 16 years, i.e., the distribution is highly skewed.
At low game levels this variable has little influence on risk aversion,
but at the 5 Rs level and above, it generally reduces the level of risk
1

It would have been better to use net worth rather than gross wealth.
However, the data on borrowings and lendings is fairly poor, but imply
that at higher wealth levels borrowings were a small fraction of gross
wealth.
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aversion and is often statistically significant, although not generally
so in the regressions using log S.
is not massive.

But again, the impact of schooling

In the five-Rs-game, the coefficient size of -8.0432

is sufficient to shift an individual who goes from 2 years to 14 years
of schooling from the intermediate risk aversion class to the slight
At the 50 Rs level, the same shift is not sufficient

to-neutral class.

to shift the individual's risk aversion by an entire class interval.
The interpretation of schooling as a proxy for human wealth
is only one interpretation.

It is also possible to view the effect as one

which affects the utility function itself.

Better schooled people could

be better able to take risks because (a) they have better information pro
cessing capacity or (b) because they have. better alternative income
opportunities if one risky venture, which they engage in, fails, i.e., they
are better insured.

The data do not allow us to distinguish these hypotheses.

Two variables which are correlated with schooling are the amount
of income received in the form of salary (i.e., from a secure job) and
a dummy variable for progressive farmers.

Salary employment, with some excep

tions, is restricted to individuals with schooling, and totally illiterate
individuals have

zero schooling).
jobs.

cf the household head sample have

Thus, schooling could partly determine the access to

Progressive farmers are those whom the resident investigators

designated as the early adopters of new techniques (5 in each village7.
Schooling is again correlated with this variable and can be expected to
contribute to it.

It is interesting to note that if these two variables

are suppressed, schooling does become statistically significant,
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even in the regressions using ln Sas the dependent variable for
risk behavior.

It will therefore be worthwhile to build and test

a model capable of distinguishing whether schooling decreases risk

aversion causally or the least risk-averse individuals are mote likely
to acquire more education.
Salary employment by itself tends to decrease risk aversion,
the sign being negative fairly consistently, although it is not statisti
cally significant at the SO Rs level.

Similarly, the progressive farmer

dummy has a fairly consistent negative sign, but at the high game levels
its coefficient is so small that it is not significant.
Luck or past experience:

Econcmists would not usually expect that

past experience with a random process,which is as transparent as flipping
a coin, would have a strong impact on a person's next choice over alternatives
defined on it.

This is a hypothesis which psychologists would be more

fond of, and such a view is strongly supported by the experiment.
experience or luck is defined as

r

Past

Xi, where i is the game number 1, 2,

i

3, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 12, and X takes a value of 1 when the person wins, -1
when he loses and O when he neither wins nor loses (alternative zero). 1

The coefficient is consistently negative and almost always statistically
significant.

Note also that its size tends to decline as the game level

rises, i.e., its impact is weaker the higher the stakes.

Nevertheless, at

the 5 Rs level (after 7 games), a person who had consistently won (luck=
+7) would tend to shift from playing alternative C to playing alternative
1

For each game, the luck variable is only defined over the preceding
game, i.e., a new luck variable is defined at each successive game.
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E compared to a person who had had an equal number of &ainS and losses.
Finally, past experience does not wear off rapidly.

The answers to the

500 Rs game were collected 2 or more weeks after the last game was
actually played.

1

That past experience should have such an impact on risk aversion
implies that, after a series of drought~ farmers would be more reluctant
to invest (even if they had the same wealth levels as before the drought)
than they normally would and should on acco\lllt of their own average risk
aversion.
Age:

Age has a fairly consistent positive sign in games up to

the 5 Rs level but a consistently negative sign at the 50 and 500 Rs
level.

At the 50 Rs level it is sometimes statistically significant but

not at the 500 Rs level.

Is it possible that yo\lllg people are more

willing to engage in risky games at low stakes whereas older people,
having dealt much more in risky economic games at high stakes, might
be more willing to take risks at the high levels?

But at the 50 Rs level

the quantitative impact of even 38 years of age difference are not
sufficient to shift an individu~l 's choice by an entire class interval.
Sex: The women dummy variable exhibits very inconsistent coefficient
signs, being as often positive as negative.

At high game levels it

1 Psychologists working experimentally in the area have found that
individuals exhibit preferences for heads or tails in coin tosses,
Since the winning sign of the coin was changed for each game level, such
preference cannot account for the observations on the luck variable. But
it is possible that the preferences for one side of the coin seen in
earlier experimental work might be caused by whether a person had a win
ning or losing streak on one side of the coin.
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does not appear to affect behavior at all.

Clearly, there is little

support for the hypothesis that women are less willing to take risks
than men, once adjustment is made for variables such as schooling.
In tabular analysis it was noted that--on the average-women are slightly more
risk-averse than men (means not significantly different).

At best, one

can explain this by the fact that, in the environment studied, women do
not have equal access to education as men.

Not a single woman in the

sample ever attended school.
Working age adults:

This variable approximates the proportion of

productive individuals in a household:

it varies on the unit interval,

i.e. it is the weighted number of adults between the ages of 15 and 59
years divided by the weighted sum of family members. 1

The lower this ratio,

the higher the proportion of individuals whom the working age adults have to
support.

One would thus expect the variable to have a negative siV1 by

saying that those with few dependents can afford to take more risk.
hypothesis is not supported by the data.
and is hardly ever significant.

This

The coefficient shifts in sign

At higher game levels it is consistently

positive, i.e., of the wrong sign.
Land rented: A portion of the new literature on tenancy assumes
that share tenancy is used to spre3d the riskiness of farming (Bardhan
and Srinivasan

1971

).

The reasoning is not based on differential

risk aversion between landlords and tenants, but it would be considerably

strengthened if tenants were generally more risk-averse than landlords.
The ''Land Rented" variable measures the net area leased in by a house
hold.

It is negative for landlords and positive for tenants.

At low

game levels there is some indication that tenants are less risk-averse
1

In computing the ratio, adult males (above 15 years of age) were
given a weight of 1, adult females a weight of 0.8 and children of 0.5.
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than landlords, not vice-versa.

At high game levels, there appears to

be no difference.
Net transfers received measures the net amount of income transfer
received from relatives and other sources between July 1, 1975 and
June 30, 1976. (It is negative for those who send transfers.)

It has a

fairly consistent negative sign which is consistent with the hypothesis
that the possibility to rely on income transfers reduces risk aversion
because it insures against adversity.

It is not a good measure of

"insurance" via transfer mechanisms, because it measures what has
actually been received rather than what can potentially be received,
but the best which can be done at this stage.
Gamblers:

The individuals who liked to gamble (by buying lottery

,tickets or playing cards, with and without money) were identified.

Less

than five percent of individuals were so identified and the variable
leads to contradictory results.
To briefly summarize the conclusions:

Past luck with a random

process makes people distinctly less risk-averse when again confronted
with it.

Physical assets tend to reduce risk aversion but neither

strongly nor very consistently. Schooling tends to reduce risk aversion
fairly consistently. Salary employment and income transfers from others
both tend to reduce risk aversion slightly, possibly indicating an
insurance effect of more reliable income sources than agriculture.
Progressive farmers tend to be slightly less risk-averse than average
farmers, but the effect is weak at high game levels and can probably not
account for their higher willingness to accept new techniques.

The
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following variables have contradicting signs and seem not to be strongly
correlated with risk aversion:
amount of land rented, and age.

Sex, working age adults (dependency ratio),
Again, emphasis has to be placed on the

weakness of all these correlations.

Massive changes in the "independent"

variables are required to lead to substantial changes in the measured
risk aversion.
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Appendix 1
Interviews vs. Experiments to Elicit Attitude Towards Risk

This appendix discusses the reliability of interview based methods
to elicit attitudes towards risk and compares the results of interviews
with those derived from the game with real payoffs.

The interview based

method was taken from Dillon and Scandizzo (1977) and slightly adapted to fit
the conditions in the study area.
method as follows:

Dillon and Scandizzo describe their

"The farmer's risk attitudes were appraised via their

choices between hypothetical but realistic farm alternatives involving risky
versus sure outcomes.

These questions form the basis of our empirical analy

sis and were geared to finding the certainty equivalents of risky prospects
involving stated probabilities.

Two types of risky prospects were used

yielding two subsets of responses for each group of farmers.

The first

type involved only payoffs above household subsistence requirements.

In

these, while the level of total income was at risk, subsistence was assured.
The second type of risky prospect included the possibility of not producing
enough to meet subsistence requirements.

Both types-of risky prospect in

volved only two possible outcomes whose probabilities were provided as
frequencies and were maintained constant at 0.75 ("3 years out of 4") for
the 'good' outcome and 0.25 ("1 year out of 4") for the 'bad' outcome."
The 'good' outcome and the 'bad' outcome of the uncertain prospect
are fixed so that the expected value of the uncertain prospect was one
half of subsistence income and twice the subsistence income respectively.
(Subsistence income had previously been established for each household
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individually by asking them - item by item - their minimum annual require
ment of all food and clothing which they considered necessary.
income ranged from Rs 462 to Rs 14117).

Subsistence

The certainty equivalent of the

prospect was then found by varying the certain income until indifference
with the uncertain prospect was attained.
The questions were made meaningful to the farmers by expressing them
as a choice between unirrigated land as the risky prospect and irrigated
land as the sure prospect.

For landless laborers the certain income was

a steady job and the uncertain income the daily labor market.

We soon dis

covered that, when expressing the prospects in this way, the choices often
did not reflect attitudes towards risk but also other preferences:

culti

vating irrigated land is much more time consuming and many farmers pre
ferred unirrigated land because it gives them more leisure.

In such cases

the interviewers pointed out that the income streams from both kinds of
land were net of labor cost and asked the farmer to abstract from their
leisure preferences.

If the interviewer felt that the respondent was un

able to abstract from other preferences, he presented the same questions
but in the form of different income streams such as animal husbandry versus
crop enterprises or trading versus fixed employment.

I see no other way

of getting around the problem of confounding, except to go back to pure
betting questions; but farmers do not.·understand why pure betting ques
tions are asked in the first place.
The method was pretested at the same time as the investigators were
trained.

All investigators have a master's degree in agricultural economics

and--with one exception--had worked in their villages collecting data
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for more than one year.

It is unlikely that one could find better quali

fied and trained investigators.

During this entire phase all of us involved

had the feeling that most respondents were taking the questions seriously
and making an effort at providing a reasonable answer.
not have continued.

Otherwise we would

The first suspicion of unreliability arose when the

results from one village showed that one investigator could not have under
stood the method properly.

The answers he obtained depended on whether he

started to approach the certainty equivalent from below or above.

The next

suspicion arose when the data for the two neighboring villages Shirapur and
Kalman were analyzed.

They are shown in Table A-1.

The certainty equi

valents were converted into partial risk-aversion coefficients using a
constant risk aversion function approximation and grouped into the same
classes as those of the experimental study, except that the intermediate
and moderate classes were pooled. (The interval of partial risk aversion
coefficients covered by these two classes were so small relative to the
variability in interview answers that the frequency of observations in each
class was small.)
The second

First) compare the results in the two neighboring villages of the first
survey which was done by two different investigators, A and B.

Shirapur

shows much more risk aversion than Kalman although both villages are very
similar.

The difference between the distributions of attitudes is statis

tically significant.
We then reinterviewed all households in four of the six villages.
In the villages of Akola district, each investigator interviewed half of
the respondents in his own village and half of the respondents in his

Table A-1
Reliability of Survey Results in Shirapur and Kalman

I.

Village
and
Survey
Shirapur
(second)

Risk AversioTI, Distributions Obtained by Different Investigators in Two Villages•

Survey or
RE,survey

Investigator

Risk Aversion Class
Intermed.
or
Severe
Moderate
Extreme

Slight
or
Neutral

Negative

Number of
Observations

A

RE,survey

10

9

4

B

Survey

20

10

3

Kalman
(first)•

A

Survey

4

5

5

11

4

29

Kalman
(second)

B

RE,survey

11

12

1

2

3

29

Shirapur
(first)

II.

Number

21\

Remained in same class
Switched into neighboring class

18}

ChangE,d by two classes on risk
aversion side

10

ChangE,d from extreme risk a"·ersion
to slight or neutral
ChangE,s from risk averse side to
negative risk aversion
(excluding shift from slight or
neutral to negative)

:}

Shirapur first ve1. Kalman first

Chi Square• 27.71

Shirapur first

Chi Square• 15,91

Shirapur second

Kalman first vs. Kalman second

*In ab~olute numbers

33
33

Anal1.sis of Switches in Classification

On ReE1urve1. as compared to Survey

VEI.

5

5

Chi Square• 13.53

Percent of s.!!!!!P_le size

62.9

16.1

21.0

X 4,0.05
2
• 9.49

,..,
,D
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neighboring village.

In those villages not much systematic difference be

tween investigators or between rounds could be observed, although the two
answers of many individual respondents were quite different.

In Shirapur

and Kalman each investigator reinterviewed the households of the other vil

lage and the results are given in the first and fourth line of Table 3.
It is clear that in each village investigator B classifies respondents as
much more risk-averse than investigator A.

The differences between in

vestigators are statistically significant.

The shift to more pronounced

risk aversion must be an investigator bias and cannot be caused by the time
lag of more than a month between interviews, since the time sequence of in
terviewers was reversed in each village.

Clearly the interview technique

is subject to severe investigator bias, despite the fact that both inter
views tried not to influence the respondents.
Panel II shows the stability of the answers from individual respon
dents between the two rounds and thus accounts for offsetting shifts of
two respondents between classes of risk aversion.

62.9% of. individuals

remained in the same class or shifted into a neighboring class.

Particu

larly disturbing is the fact that between interviews more than 20% of
individuals are radically reclassified, either between extreme risk
aversion and neutrality or between positive and negative risk aversion.
A similar analysis of shifts has been performed in Table A-2 for
the experimental game.

Note that, at the high payoff levels, radical re

classifications must be very rare because the extreme and the neutral:-to
negative risk aversion groups contain only very small proportions of the
population.

The classifications for the shifts in the game results are

Table A-2
Analy_si_s_ of _Frequency_of Shifts Among Classes of Risk Aversion in the Game*

Those who chose
OnlI efficientlI
Shift
Shift
Shift
by 2
by 1
by 3

Games
Involved

Unchanged

1 and 2
0.50 Rs

15.7

37.4

14.S

Rs

32.2

33.5

7 and 9
5 Rs

39.6
62.7

Inefficientli
Both
Times
Once

No. of

Shift
by 4

Shift
by 5

5.5

1.3

1.3

23.0

1.3

235

12.7

2.5

1.3

.9

15.3

1.7

236

26.8

15.3

1.3

0.4

1.7

14.9

1.7

235

19.5

5.1

11.0

1.7

118

Observations

4 and 5

o.so

12 and 17
50 Rs.
a

a

Grune No. 17 is hypothetical

*In percent of number of observations

~

I-'
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also somewhat finer because the intermediate and moderate groups are treated
as separate categories.

If preferences were very stable, people should re

main in the same class or, at most, shift by one class if they previously
were indifferent between two games.

Between the first and the second 0.50-

Rs-game only 53.10% of individuals remain stable in this sense, the other
shifting by two or more classes or choosing inefficient alternatives at
least once.

This level of instability is roughly comparable with the inter

view results in Table A-1.

more

stable.

However, as payoffs increase, answers become

At the 50 Rs. level over 60% of individuals do not change

their choice and an additional 19.5% switch only to a neighboring alternative
which is consistent with indifference.

Note that game 17 is only hypothetical

and it is possible that choices would have been more or less stable if the
game had really been played.

Of course, at the 50 Rs level, switching is

severly constrained by the fact that very few individuals are observed in
the extreme and neutral-to-negative classes of risk aversion so that the
observed stability is likely to be reliable.
At the lower game levels, much of the increased stability could be
caused by learning.

The answers

f4uw

~d.JJJ.~~

4 and 5 are not less stable

than from games 7 and 9, despite the higher game level of the latter two.
Table A-3 compares our own interview results with the game results and
the interview results of Dillon and Scandizzo.

The intermediate and moderate

class of risk aversion have again been combined.

Dillon and Scandizzo

give explicit data on the slight-to-neutral and negative classes of risk
aversion, but not on the "extreme" classification.

I chose to put only those

individuals into the extreme class who opted for the highest possible cer
tainty equivalent in their study.

In comparing interview results with

Table A-3
Comparison of Interview Based and Experimentally Based Distribution of Risk Aversion*

A.
B.

Interview
a
Subsistence-at-risk
Interview
a
Subsistence-assured

I

Extreme

Severe

Intermediate
or
Moderate

Slight
or
Neutral

27.0

34.3

18.0

6.3

14.4

n. appl.

222

18.2

43.6

15.5

9.1

13.6

n. appl.

220

No. of
Negative

Ineffi
cient

Obser
vations

c.

Game No. 2; 0.50 Rs

1.7

5.9

48.7

15.1

1 8.5

10.1

118

D.

Game No. 12; SO Rs

2.5

5.1

74.6

6.8

1.7

9.3

118

E.

Game No. 16; 500 Rs

2.5

8.2

85.9

0

0.9

2.5

118

Dillon and Scandizzo's Interview Based on Results from Brazil

F.
G.

Subsistence-at-Risk
Subsistence-assured

(A) vs (C)

a
a

b

26.2

57.3

0

16.5

n. appl.

103

32.0

32.1

8.7

27.2

n. appl.

103

CHI-SQUARE= 96.87

x24,0.05

m

9.49.

All other chi-square values for interview versus games

exceed the above value of 96.87

*In

percent of number of observat:l.ons
aSubsistence-at-risk and subsistence-assured refer to two different payoff levels. In the f.irst, the "bad"
outcome would result in the farmer not being able to meet his subsistence income while in the second case
the bad year outcome would exceed that level.
b Computed from tables 2, 3 and 4 by combining the data for sharecroppers and small farmers. The 103 respondents do not include 15 respondents who were not willing to answer the questions or whose answers were
internally inconsistent, as judged by the interviewers. Similarly the 222 farmers in my own interview
studies excludes roughly 10 respondents on similar grounds.

...,

-~
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game result,, also note that in the game the favorable and unfavorable pros
pects had 50% probabiliti es each, while for the interview methods these pro
babilities were 75% and 25% respectivel y, i.e., the distribution of outcomes
was skewed.
The interview results of Dillon and Scandizzo are similar to my own. 1
A large proportion of individuals seem to be extremely risk-averse (18.2%
to 32%) which is in sharp contrast to all the experimenta l results. ·Also
all interviews find a sizable proportion of risk preferers
and 27.2%.

of between 13.6%

Such a high proportion of risk preferers is found only in the

0.50 Rs game but at higher payoffs the fraction is insignifica nt.

Note

that in the interviews the payoffs were roughly equal to or exceeded the
payoffs of the 500-Rs.-gam e. 2
The interview results also identify more individuals in the severe
risk aversion class than the game.

In my own interview results the severe

and extreme risk aversion classes combined contain 61% of the population
(at both levels of payoff) while in the 500 Rs game these classes contain
only 11.7% of the respondents .

All the differences between the interview

and the game results in India are statistical ly significant .
Of a total of 118 farmers available for interview, Dillon and Scan
dizzo excluded 15 because they either did not want to answer or because
their answers were internally inconsisten t.

In the game all those present

1

The only qualitative difference is that the proportion of individuals
with negative risk aversion is roughly constant in my study while it increases
substantial ly in the study by Scandizzo and Dillon.
2

Kennedy (1976) used an interview technique based on focus loss with
Australian farmers. Of 27 farmers who gave consistent answers, eight or 29%
were found to prefer risk and one was risk neutral. Unfortunate ly, I can
not compute the number or extreme risk averters from his results. Also, note
that Kennedy disregarded the results of nine farmers (out of 36) because of
inconsisten cies in their answers.

4.'.>

want to play, but even there inconsistencies with "rational" behavior can
arise, such as choosing risk-inefficient alternatives.
The question arises why the interview results so radically mis
measure the real extent of risk aversion.

There seems to be a tendency

for interview results to particularly exaggerate the extent of severe
and extreme risk aversion.

But it cannot only be such a systematic bias

because the interviews also exaggerate the extent of risk neutrality and
preference.

Furthermore, the only reason for the misleading results does

not seem to be the absence of real payoffs because the 0.50 Rs game shows
more individuals to be risk-neutral or preferring than the interview, but
fails to show as many severe or extreme risk averters.

The mismeasurement

must also result f~om the fact that--in an interview-a respondent usually
has less than one-half hour to reflect and understand the complicated
question of how much expected return he is willing to give up for a re
duction in risk.

In the game reflection times are much longer and no in

terviewer is present who would be pleased if the respondent gave his answer
quickly--a fact which the respondent also knows.

Agricultural production

decisions, and :many other real life decisions, are taken with much longer

lead times than one-half hour from the time that they are first considered.
We therefore must conclude that evidence on risk aversion from pure inter
views is unreliable, nonreplicable and misleading, even if one is interested

only in a distribution of risk aversion rather than a reliable individual
measurement.
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